What is the purpose of the corporation? The debate has continued for a long time without a clear answer partly because corporate law is often silent or ambiguous on the purpose of the corporation. The debate is largely academic and has limited dialogues with corporations that manage business in the real world. If corporations themselves articulate the purpose in their constitutive documents, it might be helpful to resolve the corporate purpose controversy. China offers a valuable empirical setting to examine how corporations formally state the purpose in their corporate charters. The empirical findings in this article show that the purpose clause in the articles of incorporation is not static but evolving with institutional and organizational demands.
Introduction
What is the purpose of the corporation? Is it to maximize shareholder wealth or to achieve some other set of social, political, or economic goals? This question has been the focus of a major scholarly debate that has continued for a long time without a definite answer. 1 'For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees' (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1145. 2 For instance, most corporate statutes in the United States simply provide that the purpose is to 'engage in any lawful act or activity'. Delaware General Corporation Law Section 101(b) provides that 'A corporation may be incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes, except as may otherwise be provided by the Constitution or other law of this State'. In Canada, the Canada Business Corporations Act makes no express reference to the objective of the corporation. 3 In the United States, scholars have different views on whether corporate law requires directors to maximize shareholder wealth. For the view that the law requires shareholder wealth maximization, George A. ' (2014/2015) 70 The Business Lawyer 1. In Canada, the recent landmark case with regard to the purpose of the corporation is BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders (2008 . Canadian legal practitioners split on interpretations of the case. Carol Liao, 'A Canadian Model of Corporate Governance' (2014) 37 Dalhousie Law Journal 559. 4 Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, and the Public (Berrett-Koehler 2012) 28 (noting that 'the overwhelming majority of corporate charters simply state that the corporation's purpose is to do anything lawful'). Andrew Keay, 'Shareholder Primacy in Corporate Law: Can It Survive? Should It Survive? ' (2010) 7 European Company and Financial Law Review 369 (observing that corporate charters in UK, US, Australia and elsewhere rarely provide expressly that the purpose of the corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth).
how corporations themselves say about their own purposes. They offer a bottom-up perspective to see the corporate objective, as opposed to the top-down view given by legislation or judicial decisions. The bottom-up view has practical importance given that corporations are the entities that carry out the purpose on a daily basis. With the bottom-up approach in mind, some scholars have turned to alternative sources such as corporate websites, employee interviews and annual reports to empirically discover how corporations themselves state their objectives.
5 While insightful, this approach is subject to important limitations. Corporate purposes identified through such information sources are usually non-legally-binding, non-official, and influenced by researchers' subjective interpretations.
From a legal perspective, it would be helpful if a company's constitutive documents such as corporate charters include an express statement of the normative purpose of the company.
Unfortunately, most jurisdictions in the world do not require such a normative statement in corporate charters. Hypothetically, if companies were required to make a firm-specific purpose statement in their corporate charters, what would they say? China offers a unique empirical setting to answer this hypothetical question. In China, listed companies always include a firmspecific purpose clause in the articles of incorporation. Their purpose statements are not a boilerplate that 'the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity' as seen in Delaware and many other jurisdictions. Instead, each Chinese listed company devises its own purpose statement. Some interesting major findings emerge from the analysis of their corporate purpose clauses. First, the pursuit of shareholder value usually is not the single exclusive goal of the corporation. While companies regard shareholders as an important stakeholder group, they also often emphasize the importance of other stakeholders including society, consumers, employees, etc. Second, the prevailing purpose is not static but evolving. Companies follow trends in constructing the purpose statement. Third, legal, economic and political institutions shape the corporate purpose. China's corporate law and state capitalism leave salient marks on the purpose statement. Fourth, the function of the corporate purpose clause in the charter is more a signaling or branding device than a reflection of what the company actually does. Contrary to a popular belief that shareholder primacy is good for financial performance, companies that disregard shareholders in the purpose clause have better financial performance than those that acknowledge shareholders. Poor performing firms may have more incentives in highlighting the importance of shareholders in the purpose clause to signal their commitment to shareholder value while better performing firms may have more leeway to focus beyond shareholder value.
Meanwhile, there is little evidence that emphasizing non-shareholder stakeholders in the purpose clause is associated with better corporate social responsibility performance.
The empirical investigation of the purpose clause in the articles of incorporation provides a practical lens to revisit the corporate purpose debate. The prolonged purpose debate has been largely driven by scholars' normative expectations and with limited formal voice from corporations themselves, those who have actual control over the construction of purpose. The pragmatic language used in the corporate purpose provision is rather different from the standard terms in the scholarly debate. The purposes envisioned by scholars tend to be idealistic while the purposes professed by companies are strategic in response to organizational and institutional demands. Moreover, the variety of corporate purposes in corporate charters appears to present contractual freedom as a promising solution to the purpose controversy. However, the contractual nature of the purpose statement is far from self-contained and self-enforcing. The effectiveness of this contractual approach faces institutional constraints and intrinsic problems.
As a result, the corporate purpose, at least stated in the articles of incorporation, has limited importance in legal practice.
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of China's relevant regulations on corporate purpose. Section 3 provides a hypothetical exercise of possible features of purpose clauses from a contractual perspective in the Chinese institutional context. Section 4 conducts an empirical analysis of the purpose clauses in Chinese listed companies' articles of incorporation. Section 5 evaluates the theoretical and practical implications of the empirical findings. According to CSRC, a Chinese listed company may alter the content recommended in the Guidelines to accommodate its own needs as long as the alteration does not violate laws or regulations. While CSRC has revised the Guidelines several times since 1997, it always recommends a provision stipulating the operating purpose (jingying zongzhi) in the articles of incorporation. 10 CSRC does not provide any template for the purpose provision, leaving it to the company's discretion. In addition to the corporate purpose clause, the Guidelines recommend listed companies to include a provision of the scope of business operation (jingying fanwei).
The Corporate Purpose Regulations in China
Under the business scope clause, listed companies usually provide a long list of business activities along industry or product lines.
The separation of the operating purpose clause and the business scope clause disaggregates the notion of corporate purpose into 'strategic purpose' and 'tactical purpose.'
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The operating purpose clause concerns the strategic purpose, 'the ultimate end of the corporation'. 12 Shareholder wealth maximization is a good example. In contrast, the business scope clause is the company's tactical purpose. It refers to the permitted scope of business, such as manufacturing cars or selling insurance. The tactical purpose was once part of the basis to limit corporate activities and liabilities through the doctrine of ultra vires. Historically, corporate acts that fell outside the scope of business specified in the corporate charter were considered invalid. The trend of modern statutes and judicial practices in many jurisdictions including China has been to abandon the doctrine of ultra vires. 13 The distinction between the operating purpose clause and the business scope clause disentangles the purpose discussion from the mostly abolished doctrine of ultra vires and helps focus on the critical part of the purpose controversy. give more attention to non-shareholders' interests and/or less emphasis on shareholder wealth maximization in their purpose clauses.
As different companies face different internal and external needs, their purpose clauses may differ in countless possible ways. 18 Given that it is infeasible to enumerate and compare all possible corporate objectives, a taxonomy approach may be a helpful way to describe the universe of corporate objectives. Scholars often see two kinds of corporate purposes: shareholder value maximization versus stakeholder welfare maximization. 19 The former holds that the sole purpose of the corporation is to maximize profits for shareholders, whereas the latter views that the corporate purpose is to maximize welfare for all corporate participants including not only shareholders but also employees, suppliers, communities, etc. Intuitively, a pro-shareholder purpose is predicted to have a positive relationship with financial performance, whereas a prostakeholder purpose is expected to have a positive relationship with CSR performance.
An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Listed Companies' Purpose Clauses
At present, China has more than 3,000 companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Using systematic sampling, this article examines a random sample of 337 companies listed on the two stock exchanges. 20 China's listed companies are required to publish their articles of incorporation. Their articles of incorporation were collected from CNINFO, the disclosure website officially designated by CSRC. 21 The data collection was completed by the end of December 2017. This article focuses on the articles of incorporation effective as of 2017, but it also traces their historical amendments.
Component Analysis
Often, companies construct the purpose clause with the view to the interests of different stakeholders (including shareholders and others). This stakeholder-focus approach is probably influenced by the central question of the corporate purpose debate: in whose interest should the corporation be managed -shareholders, other stakeholders or the corporation itself? Table 1 shows the types of stakeholders expressly mentioned in the purpose clauses of the 2017 articles of incorporation. The categories are not mutually exclusive. A company may include various stakeholders in the purpose clause. Table 1 shows that shareholders are the most significant interest group, consistent with the prediction in section 3. Close to 69% of the sample firms expressly claim the importance of shareholder value, though the exact language of shareholder importance varies across companies. In the scholarly debate of corporate purpose, a popular view is that the corporation should 'maximize' shareholder wealth or act in the 'best' interest of shareholders. In the dataset, only a third of the companies that speak about shareholders (80/231) use the term of 'maximization' or 'best' return/interest. Often, companies use softer language including 'good returns', 'satisfactory returns', 'reasonable returns', 'create value' or 'protect legal rights' for shareholders.
21 CNINFO, http://www.cninfo.com.cn/cninfo-new/index.
In addition to shareholder value, Chinese listed companies usually claim to serve nonshareholder stakeholders' interests. As Table 1 shows, about 60% of the companies expressly claim to consider national, societal or regional interests in the course of doing business. About 37% of the companies treat the corporation as a distinct entity along with other stakeholders.
22
Around 25% of the companies have an express emphasis on consumers' interests. Note that while Chinese corporate law addresses employees' interests, only 17.2% of the companies refer to employees in their purpose clauses. Only 0.6% of the companies include environmental protection in their purpose clauses. None of the companies mentions creditors. When companies include multiple stakeholders in the purpose clause, they rarely specify the priority of the stakeholders. It seems that most of the time companies treat all the mentioned stakeholders equally. Table 2 shows that 82% of the state-controlled companies refer to shareholders' interest in the purpose clause while 63% of the non-state-controlled companies do the same. The result is rather counterintuitive given that state-controlled companies are often known to pursue non-economic goals and be less committed to profit maximization. 24 Two hypotheses may be offered here to explain this puzzling observation. First, as the state is the controlling shareholder, the emphasis on shareholder value is consistent with the state's interests. The Chinese state-owner is known to pursue non-financial goals. In this regard, the meaning of shareholder value may be different from the typical understanding of shareholder wealth maximization that focuses on economic gains. Second, as state-owned enterprises are often criticized for their inferior financial performance, their emphasis on shareholder value in the purpose clause may be intended to signal their financial commitment to outside investors.
Table 2 also shows that the non-state-controlled firms are more likely to emphasize consumers' interests in the purpose clause, compared with their state-controlled counterparts. A possible explanation is that the non-state-controlled firms are more market-oriented and attentive to consumer demands. For other stakeholder types, the differences are not statistically significant between the state-controlled and the non-state-controlled companies. 23 As an empirical matter, whether a listed firm is categorized as a state-controlled enterprise depends on the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholder. Chinese listed companies are required to state in the annual report the identity of the ultimate controlling shareholder. The database categorizes ownership types based on such information. 24 Existing literature has provided a range of commonly stated reasons for state ownership, including providing public goods, improving labor relations, encouraging economic development and industrialization, etc. OECD, 'State-Owned Enterprise Governance: A Stocktaking of Government Rationales for Enterprise Ownership' (2015) < https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/state-owned-enterprise-governance_9789264239944-en#page1> accessed 5 November 2018. As discussed above, framing corporate purposes around different stakeholders' interests is a common practice to formulate the purpose clauses. In addition, compliance with the law and internationalization are two other common ingredients of the purpose clauses. In the dataset, 16.9% of the companies mention compliance with the law and 22.8% refer to internationalization as part of the corporate purpose.
Trend Analysis
The hypothetical exercise in section 3 speculates that the purpose clause may change over time. In the dataset, 44 firms have ever made at least one amendment to their purpose clauses since 2004. The most common cause of amendments to the purpose clause is material asset reorganization (29 cases), often involving changes in major shareholders (such as top ten shareholders). It suggests that the identity of shareholders has great influence on the content of 26 For instance, Aurora Optoelectronics Co., Ltd., had a comprehensive revision to its articles of incorporation in 2015 because of its material asset reorganization. The revised purpose clause deletes shareholders and focuses on customers and the corporate value. Its original purpose clause was read as follows: 'To seek solidarity, be brave for progress, be efficient and pragmatic, to continuously explore the development of the pharmaceutical industry, to increase the company's product market share, to use the most stringent methods and scientific management methods to research and produce reliable, high-quality and safe drugs; to be a modern corporation that has solid management foundations, good quality reputations, technology advancements, and bright development future, with the hope of remarkable economic profits for shareholders to acquire good returns'.
Its revised purpose clause is as follows: 'To place customers first, be an industry leader, be technology guaranteed, and be continuously innovative; to provide customers with high quality large size sapphire materials and products; to be an internationally competitive sapphire supplier and realize the maximization of corporate value'. the purpose clause. When the amendment was caused by major asset restructuring, the change was substantive in content rather than merely stylistic. Other causes of change are rare. In the absence of ownership change, two companies expressly explained that the change to the purpose clause was intended to improve corporate governance.
27 Both of the companies added the importance of societal contribution in their revised purpose clauses.
Companies always conduct a careful review and design of their articles of incorporation before initial public offering (IPO). After IPO, their purpose clauses often remain unchanged.
The IPO timing presents a good observation window to capture the contemporary trend in formulating the purpose clause. Figure 1 shows has a correlation coefficient to describe the similarity between two purpose clauses. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the pair correlations. In the dataset, only one pair has a correlation coefficient as large as one, which means that only two companies have exactly the same purpose clause. Both of the companies are non-state-controlled, in the same industry and similar in their IPO timing. The most dissimilar pair has a correlation coefficient as small as -.032, which is close to zero correlation. 35 The average correlation coefficient is .208, which suggests a low correlation and great diversity in constructing the purpose clauses. To investigate factors that influence similarity, this article presents an ordinary least squared regression analysis with the correlation coefficient for a pair of purpose clauses as the dependent variable. Independent variables are as follows. First, the variable of whether the two companies are in the same industry (yes=1; no=0) anticipates that the companies are more likely to have similar purpose clauses if they are in the same industry. Second, the variable of whether the two companies retain the same law firm (yes=1; no=0) expects that law firms play an important role in framing the purpose clause and act as an important diffusion agent of legal Therefore, it includes the variable of whether the two companies are headquartered in the same province (yes=1; no=0). Finally, the variable of logged asset difference considers that firms similar in size may adopt similar purpose clauses.
The regression analysis shows that all the independent variables are statistically significant (p<.001). Figure 3 shows the average marginal effects with 95% confidence internals (CIs) based on the regression model. 37 The results suggest that companies have greater similarity in their purpose clauses when they are in the same industry, of the same ownership type, headquartered in the same province, use the same law firm, or adopt the clause in the same period; meanwhile, firms that have larger differences in asset size have greater dissimilarity in their purpose clauses. Among all the five dichotomous variables, 38 the time of adopting the purpose clause is a particularly salient factor. Companies follow trends in formulating their 36 There is a large body of sociological and organizational science literature on the diffusion of innovation. According to the literature, professions are important agents that spread new practices throughout the system. 37 Figure 3 also shows which variable is statistically significant. If the confidence interval does not include the value of zero effect (the red line), there is a statistically significant effect. All the confidence intervals in Figure 3 do not include the value of zero effect and therefore suggest statistically significant effects. 38 In Figure 3 , the only variable that is not a dichotomous variable but a continuous variable is logged asset difference. Overall, the similarity analysis confirms the great diversity of corporate purposes.
Consistent with the hypotheses in section 3, the diversity arises from companies' internal attributes such as size, industry and ownership types. It also arises from the external environment in which companies operate, such as legal and geographical environments.
Financial Performance Analysis
Companies that emphasize shareholder value in their purpose clauses presumably would be expected to have better financial performance. could be possible that focus on shareholder value is detrimental to financial performance. 39 For example, a corporation may have problems to attract high-quality employees, loyal customers, reliable suppliers, etc. when such non-shareholder stakeholders feel that their rights are not well protected. Still, it is important to note that having a shareholder-oriented purpose clause in the charter does not mean actual implementation of pro-shareholder decision-making and culture in the company. In this regard, the former explanation seems more plausible than the latter. 
CSR Performance Analysis
As Table 2 shows, a large number of the sample companies expressly mention nonshareholder stakeholders such as nation, society, consumers and employees in their purpose clauses. It is expected that companies with special attention to non-shareholder interests in the 40 For panel data analysis, a fixed-effects model is inappropriate to investigate time-invariant causes of the dependent variable. In this sample, many subjects change little or not at all in the independent variables. The Hausman test shows that the preferred model is random effects.
Without missing data, there would be 1011 (i.e., 337*3) observations. There are 55 unavailable observations for the purpose clause variable (because some firms that went public in 2016/2017 did not disclose information about their pre-IPO articles of incorporation and thus their purpose clauses for the years of 2015/2016 were unknown), 36 missing observations in ROIC, one missing observation in ROE. purpose statement may have better performance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) than those without giving any remarks. As there is no consensus on CSR metrics, it is challenging to measure CSR performance. 41 Nevertheless, a commonly accepted bottom-line indicator of CSR performance is whether the company publishes any CSR reports. Table 5 reports a regression analysis on the relationship between CSR reporting and the express inclusion of non-shareholder stakeholders in the purpose clause.
As Table 5 shows, controlling for ownership type, number of employees, financial performance and industry, companies that expressly refer to stakeholders in the purpose clause are more likely to publish CSR reports (i.e., all the coefficients for the variable of stakeholders (16) 111.39*** 109.62*** 122.59*** Note: * p <.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001. The data for the dependent variable was manually collected from corporate annual reports (a Chinese listed company is required to make a statement in the annual report whether it publishes a stand-alone CSR report in the year) and corporate websites. The data for all the independent variables except for the purpose clause were collected from CSMAR, a widely used database on China's listed companies.
Implications and Questions

Implications for the Scholarly Debate about Corporate Purpose
Scholars have been debating the normative purpose of the corporation for a long time.
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The debate has developed along two major competing views: shareholder wealth maximization versus stakeholder welfare maximization. The empirical charter data of Chinese listed companies reveals some blind spots in the scholarly debate.
The scholarly debate has largely continued in theoretical isolation with limited sensitivity to realities. The debate implicitly assumes that there must be only one best purpose for all corporations, regardless of individual corporate attributes and institutional variables. However, in reality, each corporation may have its unique organizational needs. For example, as found in this article, Chinese state-controlled companies, compared to non-state-controlled ones, are more likely to highlight shareholder value partly out of the need to signal profit commitment. In addition, different corporations may encounter different institutional demands. Corporate purpose cannot be defined without reference to the political, economic, and legal environments in which the corporation is embedded. The Chinese experience illustrates this institutional impact on the construction of corporate purpose. As this article shows, a great majority of the Chinese corporations consider the interests of a variety of stakeholders rather than taking shareholder wealth maximization as the single exclusive goal of the corporation. China's political economy and its recent legal recognition of corporate social responsibility are important factors in adopting this stakeholder perspective.
Moreover, the debate implicitly assumes that there should be a stable, unchanging purpose for the corporation. However, corporate purpose is not static and may change quite 43 See (n 1).
quickly. The two-decade data examined in this article shows the evolution of the prevailing corporate purpose in China, from the celebration of shareholders in most of the corporate charters in the 1990s to a significant downplay of shareholders beginning after the turn of the century.
Furthermore, there is a gap between theoretical purposes and practical purposes. Scholars heavily use the terms of 'maximization' and 'best interests' when constructing the purpose theories. The practical experience in China suggests that companies rarely adopt the term of 'maximization' to describe their objectives. Instead, companies often use terms such as 'good returns' or 'satisfactory returns', even when they claim that the pursuit of shareholders' interests is the sole purpose. 44 How to explain the gap between the idealistic purposes envisioned by scholars and practical purposes professed by corporations? One possible explanation from the perspective of economics is that scholars simulate the corporate purpose in a stylized world of economics where humans are rational actors and act to 'maximize' their utility or welfare, whereas corporate managers (and controlling shareholders) operating business in the real world are more sensitive to the problem of 'bounded rationality' and thus 'aim at a "satisfactory" welfare achievement instead of the best possible outcome'. 45 From a legal perspective, maximum/best is a standard higher than good or satisfactory. Corporate managers (and controlling shareholders) whose behavior may be evaluated against the legal standard have incentives to set a lower bar in their own favor. Whether it is motivated by bounded rationality or self-interest, the practical use of 'satisfactory returns' (whether for shareholders only or for all stakeholders) moderates the tension between the two competing theories. 44 For example, Zhongshan Public Utilities' purpose clause is short and simple. It provides that 'The purpose is to generate good economic returns for shareholders'. 
Pragmatic Questions
Does the Corporate Purpose Clause Matter?
The Chinese experience raises questions about whether the corporate purpose clause really matters in practice. As the empirical data shows, companies that highlight the interests of shareholders in the purpose clause do not demonstrate better financial performance; companies that celebrate the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders in the purpose clause are not more likely to engage in CSR reporting. It suggests that companies use the purpose clause to pay lip service for the interests of shareholders and/or other stakeholders.
The lack of practical importance may be attributable to the institutional constraints and the intrinsic nature of the purpose clause. As to institutional constraints, Chinese corporate governance generally suffers from the lack of enforcement.
46 Moreover, existing research shows that the Chinese Communist Party and the government play a big role outside the ordinary corporate governance organs described in the corporate charter. 47 The intrinsic nature of the purpose clause further exacerbates the enforcement problem. The empirical data shows that the language used in the purpose clauses is very broad and vague. The broadness and vagueness is necessary given that the purpose clause is a fundamental provision in the corporate constitution and serves as the guiding principle of the corporation. If the purpose clause is disputed in court, it will entail competent legal infrastructure to interpret the vague language. In addition to the concerns about macro-institutional capacity, the micro-rule design requires detailed implementation rules to realize the principle-based goal statement. The corporate purpose clause should not be a stand-alone provision in the charter. It requires complementary provisions to turn the abstract purpose into concrete measures. While the great majority of the sample Chinese companies provide that the corporate purpose is to pursue the interests of shareholders as well as other stakeholders, none of them adopts any relevant legal mechanisms to implement the purpose other than those already provided in the corporate statute.
China's corporate statute requires employee participation in board decision making under certain circumstances. However, the statute does not give non-shareholder stakeholders such as employees any rights to initiate legal proceedings. Empirical studies consistently show that 48 This author conducted a search in China Judgements Online, a Chinese court cases database maintained by the People's Supreme Court of China. By using the keyword "jingying zongzhi" (i.e., operating purpose) as used in the articles of incorporation, I found 144 civil cases with reference to the keyword. However, none of the cases involved any disputes that required any interpretation or application of the corporate purpose. The reference to corporate purpose was simply incidental, usually because it appeared in evidentiary documents. 49 Empirical studies of Chinese corporate law mainly focus on the judicial application of the vague concept of fiduciary duties formally introduced in the Chinese corporate statute in 2006. Guangdong Xu, 'Directors' Duties in China ' (2013) 
What Is the Relationship with 'Social Enterprises'?
The Chinese experience raises questions about the relationship between the regular business corporation and an emerging hybrid business form that simultaneously pursues profitmaking and public good purposes, commonly referred to as 'social enterprise'. In recent years, many countries including Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States have adopted a kind of social enterprises. 51 The recent emergence of social enterprises aims to challenge shareholder wealth maximization as the single exclusive goal of the corporation. A common feature of the recent social enterprise statutes requires a purpose statement in the corporate charter. In addition to seeking profits, a social enterprise must declare its commitment to creating general public benefit and in some cases may be required to declare a specific benefit that the business produces. Does China need to follow the trend and adopt a form of social enterprise, especially given that the default (prevailing) corporate purpose of the regular business fundamentally, when a contractual approach to corporate purpose is adopted, what is the purpose of adopting the legal form of social enterprise? A major difference between the contractual approach to corporate purpose for the regular business form and the required dual purposes for the social enterprise is that the former gives wide discretion to the corporation to decide whether to provide any contractual commitment to stakeholders while the latter statutorily mandates some legal commitments to public good purposes. For instance, both the UK community interest company and the British Columbia (Canada) community contribution corporation are subject to asset-lock and dividend restrictions to ensure that the corporate assets and profits are devoted to public goods rather than distributed to shareholders. 53 In addition, the western social enterprise laws have more teeth because shareholders can sue if they believe the board of directors is not pursuing the entity's social purpose. 54 This would not be a viable claim under Chinese corporate law.
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Still, the Chinese corporations' contractual approach and the modern social enterprise statutes share an important similarity in enforcement. While modern social enterprise statutes have a vision beyond profit maximization for shareholders, they do not provide any enforcement 52 To date, China has not adopted any modern social enterprise law. Though it has been argued that China has the 'social welfare enterprise' (shehui fuli qiye) as a form of social enterprise, the social welfare enterprise is not a modern business corporation and has a historical root in the 1950s. The purpose of the social welfare enterprise is legally defined, i.e., to provide disabled people with employment. The social welfare enterprise is not a corporation and it does not have governance features anywhere comparable to the so-called 'benefit corporation' in the US, the community contribution company in Canada, or the community interest company in the UK. rights to those other than shareholders. Some social enterprise statutes in the United States even expressly disclaim that directors owe any fiduciary duties to various stakeholder beneficiaries named in the purpose statement.
56 Likewise, the sample Chinese corporate charters do not provide any enforcement rights to various named non-shareholder beneficiaries. As the articles of incorporation are approved by shareholders rather than non-shareholder stakeholders, the contract (i.e., the articles of incorporation) is between the corporation and its shareholders. Nonshareholder stakeholders may argue that they are intended third-party beneficiaries if the purpose clause expressly protects their interests. Under the contractual approach, the corporation may adopt a defensive strategy by including a 'no non-shareholder beneficiary clause' in the charter to prevent non-contracting parties from making any intended third-party beneficiary claim.
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Without credible enforcement by those affected by the proclaimed corporate purpose, the special incorporation of a social enterprise is more of a high-profiled marketing strategy whereas a stakeholder-oriented purpose clause in a regular business organization's charter is no more than a low-profiled branding device.
Conclusion
As a theoretical matter, corporate purpose seems a fundamental issue of corporate law.
However, as a matter of practice, the corporate purpose articulated in the articles of incorporation 56 Both Colorado and Delaware benefit corporation laws deny that directors owe any duty to a beneficiary of the public benefit purpose because of that person's status as a beneficiary. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §7-101-506(2)(a); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 365(b). For more detailed analysis, see Joan MacLeod Hemingway, 'Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S. Benefit Corporations' (2017) 40 Seattle University Law Review 611, 622-625. 57 Existing CSR literature has shown that some corporations have adopted a "no-third-party-beneficiary" clause in supply contracts that incorporate labor and environmental standards. The purpose of the clause is to prevent workers and others who appear to be protected by the labor and environmental standards in the contract from making a third-party beneficiary claim. seems largely irrelevant. The Chinese experience suggests that the lack of legal importance of the corporate purpose clause stated in the articles of incorporation is attributable to the institutional constraints and the intrinsic nature of the corporate purpose. The Chinese experience also shows that the formulation of corporate purpose is influenced by a set of organizational, sectorial, regional, societal and national conditions and it may evolve over time. Given changing demands, there is probably no fixed, one-size-fits-all purpose for all corporations around the world.
